Correlations and Business Cycles of Credit Risk: Evidence from Bankruptcies in Germany by Rösch, Daniel
  
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations and Business Cycles of 
Credit Risk: 
Evidence from Bankruptcies in Germany 
Daniel Rösch 
Regensburger Diskussionsbeiträge zu den Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
No. 380 
First version: July, 2002, this version: April, 2003 
 
Published in: Financial Markets and Portfolio Management 17, No. 3, 2003, 309-331 
 
 
 
Dr. Daniel Rösch 
Department of Statistics Lehrstuhl für Statistik 
Faculty of Business & Economics Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 
University of Regensburg Universität Regensburg 
93040 Regensburg (Germany) 93040 Regensburg 
 
Phone: +49 - 941 943 2752 
FAX: +49 - 941 943 4936 
Email: Daniel.Roesch@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de
Internet: http://www.danielroesch.de
 
 
 
 
 
 DANIEL RÖSCH 
 
 
CORRELATIONS AND BUSINESS CYCLES OF CREDIT RISK: 
EVIDENCE FROM BANKRUPTCIES IN GERMANY 
 
 
Dr: Daniel Rösch (Daniel.Roesch@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de), 
Department of Statistics, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Regensburg, 93040 Regensburg, Ger-
many, Phone: +49-941-943-2752, Fax : +49-941-943-4936 
Earlier versions of the paper were presented on the 2nd International Finance Conference in Yasmine Hamma-
met/Tunisia, on the 6th Annual Meeting of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research in Zurich, on the Work-
shop I/2003 of the Research Association for Capital Markets and Risk Management in Zurich, on the 5th Dresdner 
Risk Tutorial in Dresden, on the 65th annual meeting of the Association of University Professors of Management, and 
on the 10th Global Finance Conference in Frankfurt/Main. I grateful acknowledge helpful comments from various 
discussants and an anonymous referee. 
 
Appeared in: Financial Markets and Portfolio Management 17, 2003, pp.309-331 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In the last decade, credit risk modeling has become one of the most important topics in the field 
of finance and banking. The needs for a better understanding and dealing with default risky secu-
rities have been re-enforced by the BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION 
(1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2003) who proposed a revision of the standards for banks’ 
capital requirements. 
 
One great challeng in analyzing credit risk is the issue of co-movements in default events. In 
many credit models, such as CreditMetrics, CreditRisk+, CreditPortfolioManager or CreditPort-
folioView, not only default probabilities, but also correlations are important input parameters.[1] 
Value-at-Risk calculations are very sensitive due to changes in these items. Secondly, co-
movements of obligors’ credit qualities may stress a bank’s liquidity, especially in times of eco-
nomic downturns.[2] While much is known about default risk on individual basis [3], empirical 
studies on correlations between borrowers and cyclical patterns in default rates are rather scarce. 
The BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (1999a) states that – contrary to 
market risk models - data bases for analyzing credit risk are frequently insufficient, in particular 
for non-traded obligors.  
 
By now, the main direction of modeling default correlations has its origin in the seminal model 
due to MERTON (1974, 1977) and BLACK/SCHOLES (1973). There it is assumed that the de-
fault event happens if the value of the assets of a firm falls short of the value of its liabilities. As-
set correlations are introduced by modeling the common probability that two borrowers go into 
default simultaneously. The default correlation can be analytically determined by the threshold 
model.  
 
It is possible to introduce a model which relates asset returns to one or more systematic risk fac-
tors. These factors are common to all obligors within a risk bucket and drive their credit risk into 
 the same direction. Thus, they are responsible for the co-movements or correlations. The factors 
may be assumed to be observable as in WILSON (1997a, 1997b) who uses macroeconomic sour-
ces or as in the CreditMetrics model which uses stock market indices, or they may be assumed to 
be latent themselves as in FINGER (1998, 1999), BELKIN/SUCHOWER/FOREST (1998a, 
1998b), or CREDIT SUISSE FINANCIAL PRODUCTS (1997).  
 
The framework of the New Basel Capital Accord is built on such kind of model which attributes 
these co-movements to one common random factor, whereas the factor itself remains unspecified. 
The exposure to the factor determines the asset correlation. GORDY (2000, 2003), FINGER 
(2001), or WILDE (2001) provide overviews of the model. The advantages of the model are its 
robustness and simplicity and the consequence of portfolio invariance of capital charges. Besides 
probability of default, the asset correlation becomes a key factor for regulatory capital require-
ments.  
 
Empirical literature on asset correlations and the identification of common factors for credit risk 
is rather scarce, mainly due to data limitations. Regarding estimation of correlations broadly two 
approaches exist. Firstly, asset correlations may be estimated from observable market data as it is 
done by CreditMetrics or KMV who approximate asset return correlations by equity return corre-
lations. This approach requires the subsistence of market data for the borrowers under considera-
tion. The second class treats asset returns as latent variables and estimates asset correlations im-
plicitly by observable default data of rating grades as it is done in LUCAS (1995), GORDY 
(2000), and GORDY/HEITFIELD (2000). This approach proves to be useful especially for non-
marketable assets for which prices or returns cannot be observed. 
 
Regarding risk factors, PEDROSA/ROLL (1998) analyse credit spread changes of index portfo-
lios of bonds and find co-movements, COLLIN-DUFRESNE/GOLDSTEIN/MARTIN (2001) 
investigate the impact of several factors such as change of spot rates, change in slope of yield 
curve and changes in business climate on credit spread changes. After controlling for these fac-
tors a large part of co-movements still remains and seems to be dominant. Using principal com-
ponent analysis they conclude that the omitted explanatory variables are likely to be not firm-
specific, i.e. they are systematic. Some studies use rating transition matrices from Rating Agen-
cies and analyze their dependence on the business cycle. Most of them, among others 
NICKELL/PERRAUDIN/VAROTTO (2000), find that rating transitions depend on macroeco-
nomic conditions for which the authors use GDP growth as a proxy variable. They also provide a 
survey on related studies.  
 
The present paper makes contributions to the existing research in three ways. First, further evi-
dence on co-movements of default risk and the magnitudes of asset correlations is presented. We 
use a database of more than on average 2,000,000 German enterprises from year 1980 until 2001. 
We consider “pure” bankruptcy risk and analyze the numbers of firms which go bankrupt in each 
year, i.e. we use a default-mode model framework. Thus, effects of recovery rates which drive 
credit spreads are prevented. Moreover, the interpretation of modeling and estimation using ac-
tual defaults should be more straightforward than analyzing rating transitions since rating grades 
are not directly linked to default probabilities (see e.g. NICKELL/PERRAUDIN/VAROTTO, 
2000). Then, we show how to find proxies for the systematic factors and present the results for 
various industries. We find that much of the co-movements can be explained by our business 
 cycle proxies. At last we demonstrate the consequences for Value at Risk calculations using a 
default-mode model framework. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3 presents the 
results for the history of German bankruptcies and for several industry sectors. Section 4 dis-
cusses some practical implications and section 5 provides some remarks on potential directions 
for future research.  
 
 
2 The Model 
 
2.1 Model Outline 
 
The model which we use is a variant of the two-state one factor return generating model from 
Credit Metrics which is employed in the framework of Basel II for calibrating risk weights. The 
two states are referred to as “default” vs. “non-default”. The discrete-time process for the normal-
ized return Rit on a firm i’s assets at time t is assumed to follow a one-factor model of the form  
 
ittit U1FR ρ−+ρ=  (1) 
 
where 
( )10NFt ,~ ,     ( )10NUit ,~
 
(i=1,…,Nt, t=1,…,T) are normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation one. Idio-
syncratic shocks Uit are assumed to be independent from the systematic factor Ft (which influ-
ences all borrowers jointly) and independent for different borrowers. All random variables are 
serially independent. The exposure to the common factor is denoted by the square root of ρ. Un-
der these assumption the correlation between the normalized asset returns of any two borrowers 
is ρ. [4] In the Basel II proposal as of January 2001 this correlation is set to 0.2. As in GORDY 
(2000) we assume that borrowers can be grouped into homogenous risk buckets, i.e. rating grades 
or industry sectors. In each bucket a borrower defaults at time t if his return falls short of some 
threshold β0, i.e.  
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(i=1,…,Nt, t=1,…,T), where Yit is an indicator variable with 
 
⎩⎨
⎧=
else0
t at time defaults iborrower 1
Yit  
 
The probability of default at time t for borrower i within a given bucket is then [5] 
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where Φ(.) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function. Conditional on a reali-
zation ft of the common random factor at time t the default probability becomes  
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As described in FINGER (1998), the realization ft of the factor can be interpreted as a kind of 
abstract “macroeconomic condition”. Thus, this factor can be seen as an aggregation of unob-
servable systematic forces which drive default probabilities and defaults jointly into the same 
direction. In “good years” - that is, a positive factor realization - the conditional default probabili-
ties decrease whereas they increase in “bad years”. Conditional on the realization of the random 
factor defaults are independent between borrowers. The number of defaults D(ft) at time t for a 
given number Nt of enterprises is (conditional) binomial with probability λ(ft), i.e. 
 ( ) ( )( )ttt fNBfD λ,~  
 
where B(.) denotes the Binomial distribution, see e.g. GORDY/HEITFIELD (2000).The uncondi-
tional default probability can be obtained by  
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+∞
∞−
 
 
where ϕ(.) denotes the density function of the standard normal distribution. 
 
Model (4) assumes that there is a default threshold which is time invariant and, thus, that there is 
an unconditional default probability which is constant over the time period under consideration. 
[6] A more advanced specification is to model time-varying default probabilities. This is done by 
including systematic observable risk factors, i.e. macroeconomic key figures. [7] Let  
 ( )'z Ktt1t z,...,z=   
 
denote a K-vector of risk factors and  
 ( )'β K1,...,ββ=   
 
a vector of sensitivities with regard to these factors. [8] Then within a segment the average prob-
ability of default, conditional on the observable risk factors is  
 
( ) ( ) ( )t0t0ittt  U1FP zβ'zβ'z +βΦ=+β<ρ−+ρ=λ  (5). 
  
Thus, the default probability depends on the state of the economy which is represented by the 
variables in the vector zt. A positive sensitivity with respect to a factor leads to a higher default 
probability when the factor increases et vice versa. Again, conditional on a realization ft of the 
random factor the default probability is 
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The realization of the random factor captures the effects of factors not included in the model, or 
the remaining asset correlation, respectively. The goal of including observable systematic factors 
is to make the state of the economy concisely interpretable. While the random F-factor only pro-
vides information about a “good” or “bad” somewhat abstract economic surrounding, the observ-
able z-factors provide evidence on which risk factors may be responsible for the state of the 
credit cycle and finally on the fluctuations of default probabilities.  
 
For a given time series of defaults and macroeconomic variables the parameters β, β0 and the 
asset correlation in model (4) and model (6) can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood as de-
scribed below. 
 
 
2.2 Estimation 
 
Suppose one has observed a time series of defaults 
 
∑
=
= t
N
1i
itt YD  
 
and numbers Nt of borrowers (t=1,…,T) for a given segment (for example an industry sector). For 
a given realization of the random factor in t the defaults are independent, that is, within a ho-
mogenous segment the number of defaults is conditional binomial distributed with Nt borrowers 
and conditional default probability λ(ft). To get the unconditional distribution one has to integrate 
over the random factor. Since the factor is independently and identically distributed over time, 
the marginal log-likelihood function for the observed time series (D1,…,DT) and (N1,…,NT) de-
pends only on the parameters β0 and ρ and is 
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is the conditional default probability given by (4). If covariates such as macroeconomic risk fac-
tors are included, the log-likelihood additionally depends on the parameter vector β and becomes 
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where  
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denotes the conditional default probability given by (6). 
 
As an extension of common logit or probit models an important part of the method is the integral 
over the random effect. The integral approximation can for example be conducted by the adaptive 
Gaussian quadrature as it is described in PINHEIRO/BATES (1995). Usually this log-likelihood 
function is numerically optimized with respect to the unknown parameters for which several al-
gorithms, such as the Newton-Raphson method, exist and are implemented in statistical software 
packages.  
 
Note that the correlation and the betas are the relevant parameters which one is interested in to 
estimate. Though the realizations of the unobserved random factors ft can be calculated via em-
pirical Bayes estimates, in opposite to the z-factors they do not exhibit concrete economic content 
other than when a year was a “good year” (i.e. the realization was positive) or when a year was a 
“bad year” (i.e. the realization was negative).  
 
Thus, the main difference between model (4) and model (6) is the following. Whereas in model 
(4) fluctuations of default probabilities are modeled via an unobservable systematic risk factor, 
model (6) asserts that default probabilities can be modeled time-dependent as functions of con-
crete observable covariates, i.e. the systematic observable macroeconomic risk factors. Thus, 
with model (6) observable credit cycles can be mapped.  
 
Moreover, in model (4) the time-variation of the default probabilities is captured by the variation 
of the random effect. If cyclical patterns can be identified and proxied by macroeconomic vari-
ables as in model (6) the variation of the random effect, i.e. the asset correlation should be dimin-
ished.  
 
In addition, we allow for the macroeconomic factors to be lagged. That means that some or all 
risk factors will affect defaults in the next period, or, the other way round, this years defaults are 
the result of macroeconomic conditions of past years. The advantage of including lagged factors 
 lies in the reduction of uncertainty when forecasts are established since the risk factors them-
selves do not have to be modeled or predicted. We will address this point in sections 3 and 4.  
 
 
2.3 Forecasting Defaults 
 
Given the parameters of the models a default distribution, i.e. the distribution of the potential 
numbers of defaulting companies for the next period T+1 (e.g. one year), can be calculated as it is 
shown in VASICEK (1987). If model (4) with constant default probability is used the probability 
distribution for the number DT+1 of defaulting companies within a risk segment, given the number 
NT+1 of companies in this segment at the beginning of the period is 
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where λ(fT+1) is defined analogously to (4). This distribution depends on the point of the credit 
cycle only by NT+1 since the distribution of the random factor is standard normal at each point in 
time. The cyclical variation is captured by the asset correlation and introduces some uncertainty 
and skewness into the default distribution.  
 
On the other hand, if model (6) is assumed the probability distribution is  
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where  
 ( )1T1Tf ++λ z,   
 
is defined analogously to (6). The distribution (8) explicitly depends on the state of the economy 
by the macroeconomic factors.  
 
Both default distributions can be extended to the case where the portfolio consists of an infinite 
number of borrowers and any idiosyncratic risk is eliminated. The formula is developed analo-
 gously to (7) and (8). Firstly, note that in the case of infinitely many borrowers conditional on a 
realization of the common factor fT+1 the realized default rate, i.e. next year’s percentage defaults 
δT+1, equals the (conditional) default probability λ(fT+1) in the case of (4) and λ(fT+1, zT+1) in the 
case of (6). This is due to the fact that any idiosyncratic risk is diversified and the conditional 
binomial distribution of the defaults given the “state of the world” fT+1 shrinks to a single point.  
 
In the second step - as in (7) and (8) - the unconditional distribution of defaults is obtained by 
“weighting” the conditional default probabilities with the respective probability of a given state 
of the world. Mathematically, one obtains the distribution of a function of a random variable. 
This function only depends on the unconditional default probability and the correlation. 
 
The economic difference between the cases of finite and infinite numbers of borrowers is that in 
the latter case any non-systematic risk is eliminated. This risk is responsible for the “binomial 
effect” in the conditional default distribution and ceteris paribus widens the distribution in de-
pendence of the numbers of borrowers in the portfolio. If only systematic risk is effective this 
binomial effect vanishes and c.p. only the asset correlation is responsible for the width and the 
skewness of the distribution. In the extreme case that the correlation is zero (with infinite many 
borrowers), there is no uncertainty about the default rate at all and the realized default rate equals 
the unconditional default probability.  
 
VASICEK (1991) and KOYLUOGLU/HICKMAN (1997) mathematically derive the uncondi-
tional density of next year’s percentage defaults δT+1 of the portfolio and show that the closed 
form solution is given by (ρ>0) 
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in the case of the constant unconditional default probability λ.  Its mean equals λ. In the case of a 
macroeconomic state dependent default probability, λ in (9) is replaced by λ(zT+1) and the default 
distribution becomes dependent on the point of the business cycle. The effects of constructing 
state dependent default distributions will be addressed in section 4.  
 
 
3 Results 
 
3.1 The Data 
 
For this analysis a broad database from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany is used which 
covers all yearly collected numbers of German enterprises and bankruptcies from year 1980 until 
2001. Figure 1 shows the default rates in Germany which are calculated as number of defaults in 
a given year divided by the number of enterprises at the beginning of the same year. For a more 
detailed analysis we divide the firms into 16 industry sectors and estimate the average default 
probabilities within these sectors. The sectors are composed due to the NACE code. Macroeco-
 nomic key figures as proxies for the credit cycle are provided by the Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany and by the Monthly Reports from Deutsche Bundesbank. They cover the areas 
 
• Money and capital market 
• Labour market 
• Foreign trade and payment 
• Government activities 
• Prices and wages 
• Miscellaneous 
 
Business Climate Indices which are provided by the German “IFO” Institute for Economic Re-
search were used as additional indicators for the state of the business cycle.[9] More details on 
the risk factors used in this study and on the concrete selection procedure can be found in section 
3.3 and Table 4.  
 
 
Figure 1: Default rates Germany, 1980-2001 
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3.2 Constant Default Probabilities 
 
Firstly, it is assumed that default probabilities are constant over time. We initially estimate the 
parameters of model (4) for Germany as a whole. Table 1 contains the results.  
 
 
 
 Table 1: Parameter estimates for Germany as a whole using Maximum Likelihood with 
adaptive Gaussian quadrature 
 
Description ρ  0β  
 
Entire Germany 
0.09257 *** 
(0.01385) 
-2.4898 *** 
(0.02001) 
***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level 
Standard errors are in parentheses; 
Model(4) is used: ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
ρ−
ρ−βΦ=λ
1
f
 f t0t  
 
 
As can be seen from Table 1 the estimate for the constant is about -2.49 which corresponds to a 
default probability of about 0.64%, since latent asset returns are normalized random variables. 
The exposure to the random factor is 0.09257 which implies an asset correlation of about 0.86%. 
That means that the overall asset correlation is rather low. Both coefficients are highly signifi-
cant.  
 
In the next step we split our data into 16 industry sectors which we determine by the NACE-code 
and estimate model (4) for each sector. Our hypothesis is that default probabilities and correla-
tions may differ between industries. The results are depicted in Table 2.  
 
 
 Table 2: Parameter estimates for 16 industry sectors using Maximum Likelihood with 
adaptive Gaussian quadrature 
 
Segment Description ρ  0β  
1 Agriculture, Fishing 0.07786 *** 
(0.01297) 
-2.5573 *** 
(0.01753) 
2 Mining, Energy 0.1817 *** 
(0.04012) 
-3.0455 *** 
(0.04771) 
3 Oil, Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals 0.06967 *** 
(0.02331) 
-2.3457 *** 
(0.01995) 
4 Gums, Plastics 0.08795 *** 
(0.01628) 
-2.2163 *** 
(0.02081) 
5 Glassware, Ceramics 0.1212 *** 
(0.02022) 
-2.4915 *** 
(0.02770) 
6 Metal 0.1875 *** 
(0.02779) 
-2.4188 *** 
(0.04222) 
7 Machinery, Engineering, Automo-
bile, Transportation 
0.08962 *** 
(0.01394) 
-2.2357 *** 
(0.01968) 
8 Software, Technology 0.1053 *** 
(0.01636) 
-2.3878 *** 
(0.02326) 
9 Wood, Paper 0.09489 *** 
(0.01477) 
-2.4045 *** 
(0.02085) 
10 Textiles 0.07356 *** 
(0.01238) 
-2.3439 *** 
(0.01674) 
11 Food, Tobacco 0.1354 *** 
(0.02070) 
-2.7146 *** 
(0.03032) 
12 Construction 0.1230 *** 
(0.01834) 
-2.1934 *** 
(0.02675) 
13 Consumer, Retail 0.08738 *** 
(0.01315) 
-2.5397 *** 
(0.01890) 
14 Traffic, Communications 0.1279 *** 
(0.01918) 
-2.4027 *** 
(0.02805) 
15 Banks, Financial Services, Insur-
ances 
0.07367 *** 
(0.01376) 
-2.3773 *** 
(0.01763) 
16 Consulting, Services 0.09181 *** 
(0.01378) 
-2.6175 *** 
(0.01989) 
***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level 
Standard errors are in parentheses; 
Model(4) is used: ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
ρ−
ρ−βΦ=λ
1
f
 f t0t  
 
 
Table 2 shows that the constants – or the default probabilities, respectively - as well as the ran-
dom factor exposures may vary between the sectors. The lowest default probability can be found 
in sector 2 (Mining, Energy) with about 0.11% whereas sector 12 (Construction) exhibits the 
highest probability with approximately 1.43%. Asset correlations are generally low and range 
between 0.5% (Oil, Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals) and 3.5% (Metal). All coefficients are highly 
significant. Figure 2 summarized the estimated correlations. 
 
  
Figure 2: Asset correlations for Germany and 16 industry sectors estimated due to model 
(4) 
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3.3 Time-varying Default Probabilities 
 
The model in section 3.2 assumes constant default probabilities over time. Any cyclical patterns 
are attributed to the asset correlations. Since it seems reasonable to assume that default probabili-
ties change through the state of the economy, in the next step the parameters in (6) are estimated 
using observable risk factors described above. We choose the following selection proceeding. 
The realization of the random effects from model (4) – without covariates – were estimated and 
correlated to the available set of risk factors. Risk factors and one-year changes of the risk factors 
were incorporated with time-lags of one and two years, respectively. [10] Then, the parameters of 
model (4) were estimated with combinations of the risk factors which exhibit the (absolute) high-
est correlation with the random effect realizations. We do not claim that the presented risk factors 
are the unique risk drivers themselves. Rather they should be interpreted as potentially inter-
changeable proxies for the underlying risk factors or for a somewhat abstract “point of the credit 
cycle”. Furthermore, following DUFFIE/SINGLETON (1999) and DUFFEE (1999) who suggest 
an AR(1)-process for the default intensities, we include lagged default rates as regressors. We 
restrict our models to the inclusion of no more than four factors.  
 
Firstly, Table 3 shows the estimation results of model (6) for Germany as a whole where we used 
the one year lagged overall default rate, the one year lagged average debit interest rate, the one-
year lagged change of the business climate index for construction and the two year lagged change 
 of the index for order inflows as factors. A description of the variables and the abbreviations in 
Table 3 can be found in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 3: Parameter estimates for Germany as a whole using Maximum Likelihood with 
adaptive Gaussian quadrature 
 
Description ρ  0β  1β  2β  3β  4β  
 
Entire Germany 
0.02284***  
(0.003585) 
-2.9810*** 
(0.06081) 
0.6222*** 
(0.04182) 
DR_GER_1 
 
1.0158**  
(0.3959) 
DIR_1 
 
-0.2362***  
(0.07744) 
BCICS_chg_1 
-0.1976* 
(0.1050) 
IOIC_chg_2 
***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level 
_1 means one year time lag, _2 means two years time lag, _chg means one year change of vari-
able 
Standard errors are in parentheses; 
Model (6) is used: ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
ρ−
ρ−+βΦ=λ
1
f
f tt0tt
zβ'
z,  
 
 
 
 Table 4: Variables which were used for whole Germany and the 16 industry sectors as 
proxies for the credit cycles 
 
Variable Code 
Default Rates:   
Default Rate Germany  DR_GER 
Default Rate Sector 8  DR_S8 
Default Rate Sector 9  DR_S9 
Default Rate Sector 11  DR_S11 
Default Rate Sector 14  DR_S14 
Economic Variables::  
Overnight Money Rate  CMR 
Debit Interest Rate  DIR 
Real GDP  GDP 
Private Households: Saving Ratio as a percentage of disposable in-
come  
SRPH 
Index of Effective Exchange Rate of the U.S. Dollar  FX 
Unemployment rate UNEM 
Employees (Construction) EMPC 
Index of Effective Exchange Rate of the U.S. Dollar  FX 
Index of Order Inflow, Whole Industry  IOII 
Index of Order Inflow, Capital Goods IOIC 
Index of Order Inflow, construction IOICS 
Index of Foreign Trade Prices for Imports (Crude Oil)  IPI 
  
Business Climate Indices:  
Business Climate Index Retail  BCIR 
Business Climate Index Wholesale  BCIW 
Business Climate Index Consumption Goods  BCIC 
Business Climate Index Construction  BCICS 
Business Climate Index Commerce BCICC 
Consumption Climate Index CCI 
Default rates are provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany; economic 
variables are provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany and by the 
Monthly Reports from Deutsche Bundesbank, Business Climate Indices are obtained 
from the German IFO-Institute for Economic Research 
 
 
All exposures to the observable factors are statistically significant at the 1% to 10% level. Fur-
thermore they are economically plausible. The signs of the coefficients for the lagged default rate 
and the lagged interest rate are positive. This means that higher values of the variables corre-
spond with higher default probabilities ceteris paribus. Thus, last years default rate is a good pre-
dictor for this years default rate and a high interest rate is likely to lead to an increase in default 
probabilities. The negative signs for the other two lagged variables show that positive changes of 
business climate and order inflows correspond with lower default probabilities. Moreover, the 
asset correlation has considerably decreased in comparison with the model without risk factors 
from 0.85% to 0.052%. That is, the business cycle which is proxied by the four variables is re-
sponsible for a large part of co-movements. The patterns of default rates versus fitted values is 
displayed in Figure 3. 
 
 
 Figure 3: Default rates Germany and fitted values and using model (6), 1980-2001 
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In the next step the 16 German industry sectors are analyzed. Since it is reasonable to expect that 
different industries react differently on macroeconomic conditions we admit different risk factors. 
Table 5 contains the results for the parameter estimates of model (6).  
 
  
Table 5: Parameter estimates for 16 industry sectors  using Maximum Likelihood with 
adaptive Gaussian quadrature 
 
Segment Description ρ  0β  1β  2β  3β  4β  
1 Agriculture, Fishing 0.01474 
(0.00829) 
-3.0310***     
(0.06608) 
0.6334*** 
(0.06995) 
DR_GER_1
1.3482*** 
(0.4250) 
CMR_1 
  
2 Mining, Energy 0.02179  
(0.07368) 
-5.0014***     
(0.4264) 
1.7604***   
(0.2760) 
DR_GER_1 
7.7889***     
(2.6297) 
DIR_1 
-0.5842*      
(0.2631) 
UNEM_chg_1 
 
3 Oil, Chemicals, 
Pharmaceuticals 
0.00849 
(0.07251) 
-1.8312***     
(0.2125) 
-0.5829**     
(0.2405) 
BCIW_2 
   
4 Gums, Plastics 0.02212     
(0.01531) 
-0.9523***     
(0.2025) 
-1.5256***    
(0.2267) 
BCIR_1 
1.1793**      
(0.4261) 
CMR_1 
-0.3316**      
(0.1177) 
EMPC_chg_2 
-0.2163**      
(0.1004) 
UNEM_chg_2
5 Glassware, Ceram-
ics 
0.01099     
(0.02321) 
-2.8266***     
(0.06419) 
0.9692***    
(0.08583) 
DR_GER_1
-0.3064***    
(0.06670) 
IOII_1 
0.07914     
(0.04825) 
CMR_chg_1 
 
6 Metal 0.03946***  
(0.008720) 
-3.6415***    
(0.4044) 
1.2580***    
(0.1267) 
DR_GER_1 
6.3888*** 
(1.1911) 
DIR_1 
0.2998***   
(0.07239) 
FX_1 
-0.5329*    
(0.2834) 
CCI_2 
7 Machinery, Engi-
neering, Automobile, 
Transportation 
0.02399*** 
(0.005689) 
-2.1915 ***    
(0.2182) 
0.3332***    
(0.05776) 
DR_GER_1 
0.2004***     
(0.03695) 
FX_1 
-0.6907***     
(0.1654) 
BCIC_1 
  1.7227***   
(0.5283) 
DIR_2 
8 Software, Technol-
ogy 
0.02188***    
(0.007222) 
-1.6114***     
(0.2435) 
0.2593***    
(0.03841) 
DR_S8_1 
0.1462*     
(0.07481) 
DIR_chg_2 
-0.9848*** 
(0.2179) 
CCI_2 
-0.9439***     
(0.1196) 
BCIC_1 
9 Wood, Paper 0.01544**    
(0.006050) 
  -2.3391***    
(0.1076) 
  0.3943***   
(0.05315) 
DR_S9_1 
 2.6454***    
(0.4492) 
CMR_1 
-1.4731***     
(0.4801) 
GDP_chg_1 
  -3.9129***    
(0.6286) 
SRPH_1 
***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level 
_1 means one year time lag, _2 means two years time lag, _chg means one year change of variable 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
Model (6) is used: ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
ρ−
ρ−+βΦ=λ
1
f
f tt0tt
zβ'
z,  
 Table 5 (continued): Parameter estimates for 16 industry sectors  using Maximum Likeli-
hood with adaptive Gaussian quadrature 
 
 
Segment 
Description ρ  0β  1β  2β  3β  4β  
10 Textiles 0.02866***    
(0.008025) 
 -2.9448***    
(0.08123) 
0.3150***    
(0.06432) 
DR_GER_1 
2.2837***     
(0.4494) 
DIR_2 
0.1680***     
(0.04705) 
FX_2 
 
11 Food, Tobacco 0.006538     
(0.01798) 
-2.1870***     
(0.1269) 
0.4919***     
(0.08884) 
DR_S11_1 
-5.3535***    
(0.7994) 
SRPH_1 
-0.5532*** 
(0.1421) 
BCICC_chg_1 
 
12 Construction 0.01897*** 
(0.003650) 
-2.5394***  
(0.1449) 
0.6687*** 
(0.08806) 
DR_GER_1
1.6432*** 
(0.4125) 
DIR_1 
-1.9121*** 
(0.6238) 
SRPH_1 
  -0.2825** 
(0.1092) 
IOICS_chg_1
13 Consumer, Retail 0.02081*** 
(0.003490) 
-3.0810***     
(0.05695) 
 0.5995***    
(0.04149) 
DR_GER_1
 1.6654***    
(0.3330) 
DIR_1 
-0.2359**     
(0.09662) 
IOIC_chg_2 
 
14 Traffic, Communica-
tions 
0.01914***    
(0.004610) 
-2.2522***     
(0.1078) 
0.2855***     
(0.03589) 
DR_S14_1 
 2.5393 *** 
(0.4501) 
DIR_1 
-5.0260***  
(0.7266) 
SRPH_1 
-0.4323***  
(0.1230) 
BCIW_chg_1
15 Banks, Financial 
Services, Insurances 
0.002856     
(0.06524) 
-2.7969***     
(0.05639) 
 0.4464***    
(0.05751) 
DR_GER_1
0.1468***     
(0.04604) 
FX_2 
  
16 Consulting, Services 0.02878*** 
(0.004617) 
-3.1683***  
(0.06527) 
0.7356***     
(0.06990) 
DR_GER_1
1.4939***   
(0.4266) 
CMR_1 
0.05794**  
(0.02220) 
IPI_chg_1 
 
***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level 
_1 means one year time lag, _2 means two years time lag, _chg means one year change of variable 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
Model (6) is used: ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
ρ−
ρ−+βΦ=λ
1
f
f tt0tt
zβ'
z,  
 
 
 
In each sector we found risk factors which influence default probabilities with a time lag of one 
or two years and which are statistically significant and economically plausible. In most sectors 
we used the lagged default rate and one or more additional variables as proxies for the credit cy-
cle. These additional variables are mainly interest rates and business climate indices. They enter 
the equations with economically plausible signs. Moreover, in each sector the asset correlation 
can be considerably reduced by introducing these factors, for example from 3.5% to approxi-
mately 0.16% in the metal sector which exhibits the highest correlation, or from 1.5% to 0.036% 
in the construction sector. Note that in eight sectors the asset correlation is no longer significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level. A comparison of the asset correlations estimated via model 
(4) and via model (6) is summarized in Figure 4. 
  
 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of asset correlations for Germany and 16 industry sectors estimated 
due to model (4) and model (6) 
Estimated asset correlations due to model (4) and model (6)
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For each segment the in-sample fit is assessed by running regressions due to MIN-
CER/ZARNOWITZ (1969)  
 
ttt uDRbaDR +⋅+= *  (10) 
 
(t=1,..,T), where DRt is the observed default rate, DRt* is the fitted default rate of the model, ut  is 
an error component, a and b are regression parameters. If the model fit is efficient then a=0 and 
b=1. Furthermore, the errors should not exhibit autocorrelation. Table 6 contains the results for 
Germany and the 16 industry sectors. Columns 2 and 3 show the intercepts and slopes of the re-
gressions, column 4 contains the F-statistic for a joint test of the intercept being equal to zero and 
the slope being equal to one, column 5 shows the R-square and column 6 shows the Durbin-
Watson statistic for first-order autocorrelation. Although the model fit is evaluated in-sample 
rather than out-of-sample or out-of-time due to data limitations and, thus, we do not want to 
stress the results, all models seem to be efficient. Furthermore, except for segment 3, the model 
fit, measured by the R-square of the regression, is sufficient. [11] The values of the Durbin-
Watson statistics range from 1.47 to 2.87. Thus, autocorrelation of the errors and systematic fit-
ting errors of the model over time do not seem to be a severe problem.  
 
 Table 6:Parameter estimates for Mincer-Zarnowitz regression  of 
observed default rates on fitted values from model (6) 
ttt uDRbaDR +⋅+= *
 
Segment a b F-value 
(p) 
2R  DW 
Germany 
0.00000784      
(0.00047136) 
0.99881        
(0.07062) 
0.00    
(0.9999) 0.9132 1.574 
1 
0.00008067     
(0.00055940) 
0.98409 
 (0.10221) 
0.01 
(0.9870) 0.8299 2.004 
2 
-0.00003960     
(0.00017542) 
0.98902        
 (0.12890) 
0.16     
(0.8510) 0.7560 1.581 
3 
0.00035383        
 (0.00414) 
0.96498         
(0.43520) 
0.01     
(0.9950) 0.2145 1.835 
4 
0.00023319         
(0.00170) 
0.98257        
 (0.12374) 
0.01     
(0.9901) 0.7684 2.433 
5 
  -0.00007255     
(0.00058937) 
1.01136        
 (0.08771) 
0.01     
(0.9917) 0.8926 1.695 
6 
0.00005674     
(0.00062799) 
0.99248        
(0.06762) 
0.01    
 (0.9935) 0.9309 2.438 
7 
0.00038300        
 (0.00106) 
0.97068        
 (0.08004) 
0.07     
(0.9352) 0.8910 1.748 
8 
-0.00000816     
(0.00070221) 
1.00361        
 (0.07694) 
0.01    
 (0.9921) 0.9140 2.763 
9 
0.00014394     
(0.00054729) 
0.98230        
 (0.06514) 
0.04    
 (0.9638) 0.9343 2.869 
10 
0.00005030        
 (0.00153) 
0.99651      
 (0.15375) 
0.00    
(0.9977) 0.7000 1.609 
11 
0.00000223     
(0.00016308) 
  1.00178        
 (0.04110) 
0.01    
 (0.9899) 0.9738 1.682 
12 
0.00021198     
(0.00063977) 
  0.98551        
 (0.04153) 
  0.06  
(0.9411) 0.9724 1.928 
13 
  0.00007249     
(0.00040596) 
  0.98701        
 (0.07021) 
0.02    
 (0.9830) 0.9123 1.467 
14 
-0.00000433     
(0.00041219) 
1.00046        
 (0.04508) 
0.00    
 (0.9999) 0.9685 2.767 
15 
-0.00013522  
(0.00113) 
  1.01185        
 (0.12382) 
  0.01 
(0.9853) 0.7877 1.637 
16 
0.00006211      
(0.00038809) 
   0.98608 
(0.08368) 
0.01    
(0.9862) 0.8796 1.549 
a is the intercept, b is the slope, standard errors are in parentheses; F-value is the 
result of an F-test of the null hypothesis a=0 and b=1, p-value is in parentheses, R2 
is the R-square of the regression; DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic for autocorre-
lation. 
 
 
4 Practical Implications for Risk Management 
 
Distributions of potential defaults can be very sensitive with respect to the input parameters used. 
That is, one has to be very careful in specifying default probabilities, and correlations in particu-
lar. The internal ratings based approach of the New Basel Accord allows for estimates of default 
 probabilities which can be derived from banks’ internal ratings models. The Accord as of January 
2001 handles the problem of correlations by globally assuming a conservative value of the asset 
correlation ρ of 20% between any two borrowers and thereby tries to cover any uncertainty in 
these important parameter. [12]  
 
As it was shown in section 2 the Basel II model assumes two kinds of default probabilities, one 
which is unconditional and one which is conditional with respect to a realization of the random 
factor ft. Since the realization of the random factor is contemporaneous to the realization of the 
default event the conditional PD is a random variable “ex-ante”. As a result of the Basel II as-
sumption of a high exposure to the random factor, i.e. the square root of 0.2 which is approxi-
mately 0.4472, and the assumption of a “bad-case” realization of the factor, the resulting condi-
tional default probability is heavily catapulted upwards. Capital requirements are determined by 
this conditional default probability.  
 
For the protection of the stability of our financial systems the Basel Accord well takes a conser-
vative point of view. A bank may use methodologies for risk management and controlling which 
are consistent with the Basel Accord, but she may use her own parameters for her internal risk 
models and forecasting tools if it is convinced that they are more accurate than assumed under 
Basel II.  
 
Suppose a bank with a very large homogenous and granular portfolio would use the Basel II 
model for calculating its distribution of potential defaults for the next year. That is, it differenti-
ates only between default and non-default. [13] It needs estimates for the default probabilities and 
for the correlations. To keep things simple we take the parameter estimates from our model of 
Germany as whole. Under the model which assumes constant default probabilities an estimate for 
year 2002’s average default probability is approximately 0.64%. Then we can calculate the distri-
bution of potential future defaults under the Basel II asset correlation of 20% and alternatively 
under the estimate of model (4) of approximately 0.86% according to formula (9). The two fore-
casted distributions are shown in Figure 5.  
 
 Figure 5: Forecasted distributions of potential defaults 
Portfolio is infinitely granular, Defaults are given as a percentage of portfolio size, Estimates 
from model (4) for Germany as a whole are used for forecasting the default probability 
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As can be seen the two forecasted distributions are quite different although the forecast for the 
(unconditional) default probability is actually the same. The reason for this lies in the assumed 
asset correlation which considerably expands the possible realizations of (conditional) default 
probabilities and, thus, possible defaults. For example, the 99.5% VaR-quantile under the Basel II 
asset correlation distribution is approximately 6.74% whereas it is only 1.19% under the esti-
mated correlation. Thus, uncertainty about potential defaults under the internal model is substan-
tially lower.  
 
Note that the distribution is derived under the model which assumes constant default probabili-
ties. However, the empirical evidence presented shows that default probabilities vary through 
time due to economic conditions. Then for the purpose of forecasting potential defaults the actual 
point of the credit cycle should be taken into account. Thus, calculating distributions of potential 
losses may be more accurate under model (6). Since the model is estimated using data until 2001 
and the risk factors are lagged, we plug the values of the risk factors of 2001 into our model 
equation and forecast the default probability for year 2002 for given risk factors. Since 2001 was 
a rather “bad” year, the forecast for 2002 is approximately 1.11%. On the other hand the asset 
correlation is reduced to approximately 0.052%. Figure 6 compares the distributions under the 
constant and the point-of-the-credit-cycle default probability model according to formula (9) for a 
portfolio with infinitely many borrowers. In Figure 7 a portfolio with N=1000 borrowers is as-
sumed and the default distributions are constructed according to (7) and (8) respectively.  
 
 Figure 6: Forecasted distributions of potential defaults 
Portfolio is infinitely granular, Defaults are given as a percentage of portfolio size; Estimates 
from model (4) and model (6) for Germany as a whole are used for forecasting the default prob-
ability 
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 Figure 7: Forecasted distributions of potential defaults 
Portfolio consists of 1000 borrowers each; Defaults are given as a percentage of portfolio size; 
Estimates from model (4) and model (6) for Germany as a whole are used for forecasting the de-
fault probability 
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It can be seen that in both cases the distribution under the point-in-time model is shifted to the 
right since year 2002 is forecasted to be much worse than an average year. Moreover, the reduc-
tion of the asset correlation by model (6) lets the distribution be more narrow for large portfolios. 
For smaller portfolios the nature of the conditional binomial distribution leads to a a wider shape. 
For the point-of-the-cycle model the distribution is almost symmetric.  
 
Since interests in risk management often focus on the right tails of a distribution, the Value at 
Risk quantiles for confidence levels of 99%, 99.5%, and 99.9% are shown in Table 7 where the 
Value-at-Risk is defined as the quantile of the whole default distribution for convenience. As it 
can be seen, the differences may be substantial, especially for smaller portfolio size. Sometimes it 
is argued that banks cover part of their potential losses, in particular their Expected Loss by re-
serves and provisions. In this case economic capital must only buffer the difference between the 
Value-at-Risk and the Expected Loss, which is defined as Unexpected Loss. These Unexpected 
Losses are also given in Table 7 for the three distributions under consideration. Clearly, they are 
highest for the Basel II model, but note that although the distribution under the point-in-time 
model is shifted to the right its Unexpected Losses are considerably lower than under the constant 
probability model except for small portfolio size and lower confidence levels. Thus, the reduction 
of correlations not only reduces uncertainty of potential defaults, it may also reduce required risk 
capital in an internal model.  
 
 
  
Table 7: Value-at-Risk quantiles of forecasted default distributions for different portfolio 
size 
 
Portfolio size N=1000 N=5000 N=10000 IGP 
Confidence 
Level (%) 
99 99.5 99.9 99 99.5 99.9 99 99.5 99.9 99 99.5 99.9 
VaR0  
UL0 
5.40 
4.76 
6.90 
6.62 
10.90 
10.26 
5.28 
4.64 
6.76 
6.12 
10.80
10.16
5.27 
4.63 
6.75 
6.11 
10.79 
10.15 
5.26 
6.62 
6.74 
6.1 
10.78 
10.14
VaR1  
UL1 
1.50 
0.86 
1.60 
0.96 
1.90 
1.26 
1.20 
0.56 
1.28 
0.64 
1.46 
0.82 
1.16 
0.52 
1.24 
0.60 
1.41 
0.77 
1.12 
0.48 
1.19 
0.55 
1.35 
0.71 
VaR2  
UL2 
2.00 
0.89 
2.10 
0.99 
2.30 
1.19 
1.50 
0.39 
1.56 
0.45 
1.66 
0.55 
1.41 
0.30 
1.45 
0.34 
1.52 
0.41 
1.28 
0.17 
1.30 
0.19 
1.34 
0.23 
Model for Germany as whole is used; N is the number of borrowers in the portfolio, IGP is an infinitely 
granular portfolio; defaults are in % of portfolio size; the upper half shows the quantiles of the model 
which assumes constant probability of default (PD), both under Basel II and under model correlation, the 
lower half shows the quantiles of the model with state dependent probability of default (PD); Value-at-
Risk is defined as a quantile of the default distribution; Unexpected Loss is defined as the difference 
between the Value-at-Risk quantile and the expected loss; VaR0 (UL0) is the Value-at-Risk (Unexpected 
Loss) with constant PD and Basel II asset correlation, VaR1(UL1) is the Value-at-Risk (Unexpected 
Loss) with constant PD and the estimated model correlation, VaR2(UL2) is the Value-at-Risk (Unex-
pected Loss) with time-varying PD and estimated model correlation. 
 
 
 
In summary, a time-dependent view may have some certain advantages. Firstly, one may forecast 
default probabilities more accurately depending on the point of the credit cycle. If average default 
probabilities are used one implicitly assumes that the next year will be a random realization out 
of the population from which the historical defaults were drawn. The uncertainty around the 
mean is taken into account by the asset correlation. On the other hand, if one follows the time-
dependent view one assumes that next year’s defaults are randomly drawn conditional on the 
state of the economy. In summary, if the model is valid, forecasts for default probabilities may be 
more accurate and, in addition, asset correlations and probably risk capital within an internal 
model may be substantially reduced.  
 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Correlations are the main drivers for uncertainty in portfolio credit risk modeling. In the present 
paper a model is analyzed which attributes correlations to observable common risk factors. We 
use a database of German corporate bankruptcies and find that correlations are throughout lower 
than assumed in the New Basel Accord. By introducing proxy variables for the business cycle 
correlations can be significantly diminished. Thus, forecasts for default distributions can be gen-
erated more adequately when the current point of the business cycle is taken into account. This 
leads to less uncertainty in potential defaults and may reduce economic capital requirements if 
they were measured by an internal model. 
 
 Two directions for further research should be mentioned. Firstly, the present analysis focuses on 
aggregated data for industry sectors. Thus, we could map business cycles for each segment only 
on average. The analysis could also be carried out for individuals given the availability of indi-
vidual firm data, for example from banks. Then, firm specific default probabilities or even corre-
lations could be estimated more adequately.  
 
Secondly, we did not consider estimation risk for the forecasts of potential defaults. Although the 
standard errors of the parameter estimates were rather low, the model produces additional uncer-
tainty. This should also be taken into account when such forecasts are generated.  
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES 
 
 
[1] For outlines of these models see GUPTON et al. (1997), CREDIT SUISSE FINANCIAL PRODUCTS (1997), 
CROSBIE (1998) and WILSON (1997a, 1997b). 
[2] This effect of potential procyclicality is under active discussion. NICKELL/PERRAUDIN/VAROTTO (2000) 
find that ratings downgrades and defaults are more likely in economic downturns. CATARINEU-
RABELL/JACKSON/TSOMOCOS (2002) show that through-the-cycle rating schemes would not produce procycli-
cal capital requirements in opposite to point-in-time schemes, see also ALLEN/SAUNDERS (2002) for a review.  
[3] See ALTMAN/SAUNDERS (1997) who provide a survey on developments over the past two decades.  
[4] Denoting the square root of ρ as the factor exposure may seem somewhat unusually and is only due to parameter 
parsimony. We follow the model setup in BELKIN/SUCHOWER/FOREST (1998) who also provide further descrip-
tions. In fact, specification (1) and the correlation can be re-parameterized from a normal distribution with any mean 
and variance. See HAMERLE/LIEBIG/RÖSCH (2003) for details.  
[5] This probability is actually a conditional probability, given the borrower has survived until time t. We skip the 
condition Yit-1=0 for convenience.  
[6] A related specification can be found in DAS/FREED/GENG/KAPADIA (2002), p.12. 
[7] An analogous approach is also employed for equity data, see the seminal work by CHEN/ROLL/ROSS (1986).  
[8] For a detailed description see HAMERLE/LIEBIG/RÖSCH (2003).  
[9] A description can be found under www.ifo.de: “The Ifo Business Climate Index is a widely observed early indi-
cator for economic development in Germany. Every month the Ifo Institute surveys more than 7,000 enterprises for 
their appraisal of the business situation and their short-term planning. The confidence indicator, frequently referred 
to as the Ifo Index, is derived from these responses to the Ifo Business Survey. Twice a year the Ifo Institute pub-
lishes the Ifo Economic Forecast on the development of the German and the world economy for the current and the 
subsequent year.” 
[10] The reason for using time-lags lies in the advantage for making forecasts. If we used contemporaneous variables 
the forecasts in (7), (8) or (9) would require forecasts for the macroeconomic variables for period T+1 which in turn 
requires a model for the variables, see for example WILSON (1997a, 1997b). In our time-lag approach the model 
assumptions for the macroeconomic variables are not necessary since their realizations are known in T and forecasts 
for default distributions for T+1 can be made conditional on these realizations. 
[11] Indeed, although for segment 3 one variable could be determined, the default rates are rather erroneous and do 
not seem to follow any systematic cycles. This segment also exhibits the lowest unconditional correlation, see Table 
2.  
[12] In the April 2003 proposal the asset correlation decreases with increasing default probability from 24% to 12%. 
[13] The Basel Committee distinguishes between mark-to-market and default-mode models. Since our data only 
cover default events, we employ the latter. For mark-to-market models, see BAN-
GIA/DIEBOLD/KRONIMUS/SCHAGEN/SCHUERMANN (2002).  
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